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Abstract
We model a society that values the coherence between past policy
platforms and current implemented policy, and where policy platforms
partially commit candidates to their future actions. If an incumbent
politician seeks to be reelected, she has to use her platforms to commit
to moderate policies that can be distant from her most preferred one.
Commitment is related to the incoherence cost that politicians pay
when they renege on promised platforms. In this context, we suggest
a novel mechanism through which issuing government debt can affect
electoral results. Debt is exploited by an incumbent politician, who is
in favor of low spending, to damage the credibility of her opponent’s
policy platforms, and be reelected. A higher level of debt decreases
voters’ most preferred level of spending, and makes the opponent’s
past platform a losing policy. Even if the latter chose to update her
proposal, she would not be able to credibly commit to it, given the
incoherence cost associated to changing proposals.
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“By the end of my first term, I will reduce the Reagan budget deficit by
two-thirds. Let’s tell the truth. It must be done, it must be done. Mr. Reagan
will raise taxes, and so will I.”
Walter Mondale1
1 Introduction
In this work we provide a rationale for the reelection of politicians who create
wasteful government deficits. In particular, we offer a possible explanation for
some puzzling anecdotal evidence, by linking two features of the policymaking
process extensively investigated in the political economy literature: the use of
electoral platforms as commitment devices, and the strategic implementation
of government debt.
Consider the following example. Under the first Reagan administration,
there was a substantial increase in the stock of government debt, which was
not used to increase social spending. Consequently, a fierce debate in the
Democratic primaries emerged between candidates who were still in favor of
Great Society policies, and candidates who rejected the “failed policies of the
past”.2 The latters’ main argument was that the stock of government debt
made traditional social programs unpopular in terms of the necessary tax
increases. Eventually, Walter Mondale, who was in favor of Great Society
policies, won the primaries, but lost against Reagan in a landslide. In his
policy proposals Mondale stuck to the traditional Democratic set of policies,
which, in the new context of high debt, would have been financed by higher
taxes.
Another interesting case is the one of the Italian government led by Silvio
Berlusconi in the term 2001-2006. In this period Berlusconi’s government
interrupted a decreasing trend in the government debt-over-GDP ratio and
started increasing it at the end of his mandate. While public debt was
increased, social spending decreased. Despite this bad performance, which
could suggest a large defeat by Berlusconi in the 2006 elections, his coalition
almost managed to tie, and his defeat was decided by a mere 20.000 votes.
Even though the left-wing candidate, Romano Prodi, proposed an electoral
program that merged debt reduction and social programs, the latter were
less ambitious than the past proposals supported by leftist coalitions and the
whole platform was harshly criticized as either too moderate or incoherent.
1See http://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/conventions/chicago/facts/
famous.speeches/mondale.84.shtml
2Quote by Gary Hart. See http://www.nytimes.com/1984/04/07/us/hart-presses-for-
support-in-wisconsin-s-caucuses.html
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In this paper we suggest that Berlusconi’s electoral unexpected result and
Reagan’s victory benefited from a strategic use of government debt, which
shifted the electorate’s preferences toward a lower public good provision.
This shift forced the opponents to stick to losing policies or to flip-flop their
policy stance.
Flip-flopping on policy proposals is often perceived as a damage to can-
didates’ credibility and it is often emphasized by the media.3 John Kerry’s
electoral campaign was severely harmed by his saying: “I actually did vote
for the $87 billion, before I voted against it”, referring to his vote on the
Iraq war funding. Although his seemingly contradictory voting behavior in
Congress could be rationalized,4 his critics used the flip-flopping argument to
cast doubt on his commitment on every policy he stood for. In UK politics,
a term that illustrates the same kind of behavior with a negative connotation
is “U turn”. Margaret Thatcher used it for one of her most famous sentences:
“You turn [U-turn] if you want to. The lady’s not for turning”.5
Flip-flopping is a source of concern and criticism also in the private labor
market, especially in the case of managers, see for example Anthony (1978).
Recently, Google analyzed its own job interviews and the subsequent perfor-
mances of hired managers, in order to assess what are the good predictors of
high managers’ performance. They concluded that “for leaders, it’s impor-
tant that people know you are consistent and fair in how you think about
making decisions and that there’s an element of predictability”.6
In a two-period model of electoral competition, we introduce a incoher-
ence cost (flip-flopping) to be paid at the end of the second term. The cost
measures the deviation of the second-period implemented policy from the
history of policy proposals. From a political economy perspective, the inco-
herence cost acts as a commitment device for candidates, who can partially
commit to their future implemented policies through their policy platforms.
We also introduce a strategic device, i.e. ‘government debt’, that can be
used in the first period by a conservative incumbent, who favors a low level
of public good, to move voters’ preferred policy towards a lower provision
of public good. Indeed, if the incumbent creates debt in the first period
that has to be repaid in the following period, all agents will prefer a lower
3See, for instance, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/nov/28/coalition-u-
turn-list-full.
4FactCheck.org stated that his policy statements on Iraq were actually consistent: see
http://www.factcheck.org/bush ad twists kerrys words on iraq.html
5The hypothesis that politicians face a cost in deviating from their policy platforms
has been successfully tested in laboratory experiments (see Corazzini et al. (2014)).
6See http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/business/in-head-hunting-big-data-may-
not-be-such-a-big-deal.html?pagewanted=1& r=3&&pagewanted=all
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provision of public good in the second period, in order to avoid an excessive
increase in taxation. We show that debt can be used by the incumbent to
effectively reduce the opponent’s commitment to the new policy preferred by
the median voter. By issuing debt, the incumbent is able to be reelected.
Within this framework, the model delivers several interesting results.
First, in equilibrium more radical politicians implement higher levels of gov-
ernment debt. Second, if deviations from the first-period platforms become
less important (in the determination of the incoherence cost) than deviations
from the second-period ones, the level of debt implemented by the incum-
bent becomes larger, as the opponent is less anchored to her first-period
proposal. Third, the size of the incoherence cost affects the debt of moderate
and extreme politicians in opposite directions. In particular, if the incum-
bent is more moderate (radical) than her opponent, when the incoherence
cost increases, equilibrium debt decreases (increases).
The theory presented in this paper can also symmetrically explain the
use of strategic surplus by a progressive politician. For example, a left-wing
incumbent can seize privately owned assets, e.g. oil wells, to finance social
programs. Voters become more open to social programs, because they are
not financed through taxation. At the same time nationalizations can reduce
private investments, harming aggregate welfare. As the opponent is anchored
to old policy proposals that do not represent anymore the median citizen’s
will, voters are more likely to reelect the incumbent.
Although we do not provide an empirical test for our findings, the work
of Grembi et al. (2016) can be used to assess our main predictions. Grembi
et al. (2016) analyze the causal effect of relaxing a balanced budget constraint
rule on the fiscal behavior of politicians, in small Italian municipalities. They
find that politicians facing a relaxed rule increase local public debt. Most
interestingly, they also find that the increase in deficit arises only for mayors
who can run for a second term, and who “systematically underprovide the
promised public good”. Each of these findings can be rationalized by differ-
ent stories (e.g. politicians with reelection incentives can pander to voters, or
the political process could induce a selection of bad politicians who system-
atically disappoint voters by underproviding public good), but it is difficult
to reconcile both results within a unique explanation.7 Instead, the model
developed in this paper accommodates both findings, and suggests that the
increase in public debt is not necessarily linked to public good provision, but
is instead instrumental to reduce the commitment ability of the opponent
and be reelected.
7For instance, pandering politicians should presumably increase debt to overprovide
public goods.
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The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Section (2) we
discuss our contribution in relation with the related literature. In Section (3)
we develop the basic model and in Section (4) we characterize the equilibria.
In Section (5) we introduce government debt and in the following Section we
study the equilibria with debt. Section (7) concludes.
2 Related literature
In the political economy literature, Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Persson
and Svensson (1989) are two seminal papers on the strategic use of govern-
ment debt. These theories predict that governments use debt to constrain
their successors’ actions, because the incumbent knows that the opponent
will take over the government. Clearly, these models cannot explain why
politicians who increase debt get reelected.8 Theories of fiscal illusion (see
Buchanan and Wagner (1977)), where voters retrospectively reward high
spending by the incumbent, are consistent with incumbents using debt to
be reelected. Setting aside possible arguments on voters’ rationality, these
theories are not compatible with cases in which conservative incumbents,
in favor of low spending, implement this strategy. Recently Mu¨ller et al.
(2016) proposed a game where right-wing governments are less fiscally re-
sponsible because their voters are less concerned with the future viability of
public good provision than left-wing voters. In their model the probability
of election is exogenous. Even though Mu¨ller et al. (2016) do not focus on
the relationship between strategic government debt and the probability of
reelection, they perform an empirical analysis, which shows that Republican
presidents issue more debt than Democrats. Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) finds
that Swedish right-wing local governments accumulate debt when they face
a high probability of electoral defeat, a finding that is consistent both with
our theory and Persson and Svensson’s hypothesis.9 Our main contribution
to this literature is to develop a theory that rationalizes the reelection of
conservative incumbents who increase government debt, by linking the use
of debt to the ability of commitment through policy platforms.
The use of electoral platforms as commitment devices has been tradi-
tionally included in formal models of electoral competition by assuming that
8Caballero and Yared (2010) show that, if the probability of being replaced is low and
economic volatility is high, the incumbent over-saves in the short run and over-borrows in
the long run.
9See also Davis and Ferrantino (1996), Ventelou (2002), Kroszner and Stratmann
(2005). Alesina and Passalacqua (2015) provide a comprehensive survey of the politi-
cal economy of government debt.
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candidates have a cost of lying. Banks (1990) and Callander and Wilkie
(2007)10 assume that candidates have a fixed future implemented policy, and
can choose electoral platforms, considering that they will pay a cost which
is a function of the distance between their future implemented policy and
their electoral platforms. Candidates care about being elected and about the
cost of lying, with no direct preference over policies. Since voters do not
know the future implemented policy of politicians, the latter can use elec-
toral platforms as signals. We contribute to this literature in three ways.
First, we endogenize implemented policies, by assuming that politicians have
preferences over policies and pay a cost of implementing policies that deviate
from policy proposals. Second, we introduce a dynamic feature in that the
incoherence cost is also a function of policy platforms of the previous term.
Third, we simplify the theoretical analysis, by considering a game of com-
plete information, that still delivers comparative statics similar to the ones
investigated by Banks (1990) and Callander and Wilkie (2007).
3 The baseline model
The policy space is a set of points equidistant in R, with distance  > 0,
where  is arbitrarily small.11 The set of voters is denoted by S. Let h
denote the density function that describes the distribution of citizens’ bliss
points on the policy space. We denote by M the median voter and by qM
the bliss point of the median citizen.
Voter i ∈ S lives for two periods and has per-period preferences on the policy
space represented by the following loss function:
ui(q) = −|q − qi|,
where q ∈ R is the policy implemented by the elected politician, and qi is
the bliss point of voter i.
There are two politicians, A and B. They have preferences over policies
and are also office motivated. Let A denote a candidate in favor a low
provision of policy q, i.e. qA ≤ qM , while B denotes the candidate in favor
a high provision of policy q, i.e. qB ≥ qM . The politician in power receives
10See also Backus and Driffill (1985), Harrington Jr (1993), Persson and Tabellini (1999),
Besley and Case (1995), Hummel (2010), Agranov (2016). Andreottola (2016) provides a
theory of flip-flopping driven by signaling concerns.
11As will be clear from the analysis of the model, there are subgame equilibria in which
players would like to play actions that are infinitely close to a threshold. By considering a
discrete policy space, players can play actions that are an  far from the threshold. While
 is present in the proofs, for the sake of simplicity we send  to 0 in the propositions.
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an ego rent R. We define the per-period utility of politician P ∈ {A,B} as
follows:
uP (q, R) = −|q − qP |+ PPR,
where PP is the probability that the politician is elected in that period.
The game is played in 2 periods. Each period is denoted by time t ∈
{1, 2}, with common discount rate β = 1. In the first period one of the two
politicians is in power. Let us assume that A is the first period incumbent,
while B is the first period opponent. In period 1 the incumbent A implements
a policy qA1 . After observing A’s policy, B proposes an alternative platform,
qB1 . While B’s alternative platform cannot affect the policy implemented in
period 1, it can nevertheless be useful to build B’s commitment to a given
future policy, as it will become clear once we will introduce the incoherence
cost.12
At the beginning of the second period there is an election, in which the
winner is determined by majority voting. If indifferent, a voter votes for each
candidate with probability one-half. Before the election, both candidates
declare their policy platforms qA2 and q
B
2 . If elected, politician P implements
a policy denoted by q∗P2 ∈ R.
At the end of the second period, the elected politician pays an incoherence
cost H, which represents the discounted value of all future losses related to
the politician’s flip-flopping while she was in power. The incoherence cost,
which is subtracted from the politician’s second-period utility, can be thought
of as a wage loss in the private sector, a stigma in the society or a damage in
the future political career.13 It is well known that incoherence costs can play
an important role in politicians’ career. As shown by Adams and Somer-
Topcu (2009), past policy proposals have a long-term effect on politicians’
reputation. Doherty et al. (2016) show that people consider flip-flopping
from earlier policy positions less negative than flip-flopping from more recent
positions. DeBacker (2015) shows that voters penalize US senators when
they flip-flop, and that the electoral penalties increase with the size of the
change, i.e. they are convex.14
12This behavior by the opponent is reminiscent of shadow cabinets, a form of opposition
widely present in advanced democracies, that criticizes government policies and offers an
alternative program.
13If we imagined a continuation game that started at the end of the second period, the
players of this game (for instance, the voters of a future election for a different office or
the politician’s future employer) would simply consider the politician’s incoherence at the
end of the second period of our game and would evaluate it negatively when choosing their
action.
14Tomz and Van Houweling (2014) find similar empirical results and use them to propose
a theory of political polarization. Tavits (2007) shows that the cost of of policy shifts can
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We formalize the incoherence cost H as follows:
H =
1
2k
(
q∗P2 −
qP1 + αq
P
2
1 + α
)2
,
where the parameter k > 0 parametrizes the scale of the incoherence cost in
the utility function of the politician. The term between brackets represents
the distance of the second-period policy from a weighted average of the plat-
forms of the two periods: the closer this distance, the lower will be the cost
paid by the politician in her subsequent career.15
The parameter α > 1 measures the memory bias associated to the second-
period platform in the incoherence cost. For the first-period incumbent, who
is reelected in the second period, the incoherence cost is a function of the
policy implemented in the first period, qA1 . For the opponent, who is elected
only in the second period, the incoherence cost is a function of the alternative
proposal made in the first period, qB1 .
Note that if α → ∞ and k = 0, candidates pay an infinite cost for devi-
ating from their second-period electoral platform: in this case, the second-
period election subgame becomes a standard Hotelling-Downs model of elec-
toral competition, where candidates fully commit to their second-period pol-
icy platform.
The timing of the game is the following:
1. The first-period politician A implements policy qA1 ;
2. The opponent B declares an alternative proposal qB1 ;
3. At the beginning of period 2 candidates declare their policy platforms
qA2 and q
B
2 ;
4. Election takes place;
5. The second-period elected politician P implements the policy q∗P2 ;
6. The second-period politician pays the incoherence cost H.
We now introduce few simplifying assumptions.
be heterogeneous with respect to the policy domain.
15Our choice of the specific functional form for H can capture a situation in which future
employers or voters do not have access to the details of the past political process, and use
the distance between implemented policies and average proposals as a ‘rough’ measure to
evaluate the politician.
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 Assumption 1. We assume that 1
2
k < R. The value 1
2
k is the largest
incoherence cost that that the politician can pay in equilibrium: we
assume that the incoherence cost is lower than the rent from office
R. This condition eliminates the possibility that a politician chooses a
policy platform with the sole purpose to intentionally lose the election
and avoid paying the incoherence cost.
 Assumption 2. We assume that, if a politician is indifferent between
actions that include the median voter’s bliss point qM , she implements
qM . This assumption prevents multiplicity of (uninteresting) equilibria.
 Assumption 3. We assume that both candidates’ bliss points are suffi-
ciently extremist: |qP − qM | > k. As will be clear from the equilibrium
analysis, this condition makes necessary, at least for some values of the
parameters, the use of platforms as commitment devices.
 Assumption 4. Politician A, in favor of a low provision of policy q,
can only propose platforms lower or equal to an upper bound u, while
B, in favor of a high provision of policy q, can only propose platforms
larger or equal to a lower bound l. The existence of u and l is needed
in the model with debt, as it will be clear in the related analysis. For
convenience we consider u = l = qM , but different levels of u and l do
not qualitatively affect the results.16
4 Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium (SPNE) of the model, using backward induction. The elected politi-
cian P at t = 2 implements a policy that maximizes her utility, which depends
on her previous actions qP1 , q
P
2 :
q∗P2 = arg max
q∈R
−∣∣q − qP ∣∣− 1
2k
(
q − qP12
)2
,
where we will refer to qP12 :=
qP1 +αq
P
2
1+α
as the ‘average’ platform.
The following proposition characterizes the policy implemented by the
politician elected in the second period:
16Thus each politician can only propose platforms on her ‘side’ of the policy space.
9
Proposition 1 (The second-period policy) The policy implemented in
the second period is:
q∗P2 = q
P , if |qP − qP12| ≤ k,
q∗P2 = q
P
12 − k, if qP < qP12 − k,
q∗P2 = q
P
12 + k, if q
P > qP12 + k.
The proof is in the appendix.
In equilibrium, politician P trades-off her policy preferences with the cost
of deviating from her average platform. If her average platform is sufficiently
close to her bliss point, the politician implements her bliss point. If instead
the distance |qP12−qP | is larger than k, she implements a k-deviation from her
average platform in the direction of her bliss point. Therefore the average
platform creates a partial commitment for the elected politician, who can
only partially deviate from it.
Given that voters’ preferences are single peaked, the median voter’s most
preferred candidate wins the second-period elections. Therefore, we can im-
mediately conclude that the candidate whose implemented policy is closer
to the median voter’s bliss point qM wins the second-period election. In the
following propositions we first identify the winner of the election, and then
characterize the subgame equilibrium platforms qA2 , q
B
2 .
Proposition 2 (The winner of the election) Given implemented policy
qA1 and opponent’s platform q
B
1 , the winner of the second-period election is
the candidate preferred by the median voter, if both candidates proposed the
median voter’s bliss point qM in t = 2. If both candidates propose qM but
the median voter is indifferent between them, each candidate is elected with
probability 1
2
.
The proof is in the appendix.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Let us assume that politi-
cian P would be the elected politician in the second period if both candidates
proposed the median voter’s bliss point. Then in equilibrium politician P
has to be the winner of the second-period elections. Indeed, if this were not
the case, P could always deviate by declaring qM , and would necessarily win
the elections.
Proposition 3 (The second-period platforms) In the second period there
are two possible cases, depending on the election result if both candidates pro-
posed qM :
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(i) If the median voter would be indifferent, both candidates propose the me-
dian voter’s bliss point.
(ii) Otherwise, the losing candidate proposes the median voter’s bliss point.
The winning candidate P proposes qP2 that minimizes the distance |qP − qP12|,
with qP2 in the set of platforms such that |qM − q∗P2 | < |qM − q∗−P2 |.
The proof is in the appendix.
We now characterize the first-period equilibrium and analyze how the
first-period policy affects voters’ behavior in the second period. Let us con-
sider what is the optimal first-period platform for the opponent B. By As-
sumption 1, the opponent chooses a policy platform qB1 in order to win the
second-period election. Note that, by Assumption 3, if candidates’ platforms
were equal to qM in both periods, voters would be indifferent between the
two candidates, as in the second period A’s implemented policy would be
qA2 = q
M − k, while B’s implemented policy would be qB2 = qM + k. Thus,
if the incumbent sets qA1 = q
M , B reacts by proposing qB1 = q
M and by
propositions (2) and (3), candidates tie in the second period by proposing
qA2 = q
B
2 = q
M . Instead, if the incumbent proposes qA1 6= qM , she would
certainly lose the election. Formally, we have:
Proposition 4 (The first-period opponent’s platform) If qA1 = q
M , B
chooses qB1 = q
M and ties against A in the election. If qA1 < q
M , B wins
against A, choosing qB1 such that q
B
12 = q
B, if qB < 2qM−max
{
qA,
qA1 +αq
M
1+α
− k
}
,
or qB12 = 2q
M −max{qA, qA1 +αqM
1+α
}, if qB > 2qM −max
{
qA,
qA1 +αq
M
1+α
− k
}
.
The proof is in the appendix.
So far, we have characterized the opponent’s strategy. Next, let us con-
sider what would be the optimal choice by A in the first period, conditional
on losing the elections. If A is not reelected, in the first period she has two
options. She can either implement her bliss point maximizing her current
utility, or choose a more moderate policy, in order to force B to implement
a more moderate policy in the second period. Note that in the latter case,
q∗B2 = 2q
M − qA1 +αqM
1+α
+ k. At the margin, if A chooses a moderate policy,
she would reduce her utility by 1 in the first period, while she would only
increase her utility by 1
1+α
in the second period. Thus, conditional on losing
the elections, A would always implement her bliss point.
Having established what would be the incumbent’s behavior when she
is not reelected, we can exploit the results in Propositions (3) and (4) to
compute the level of utility that the incumbent would reach conditional on
the electoral result, and prove the following:
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Proposition 5 (The first-period policy) If A is sufficiently extremist:
qA < ω := max
{
2qM − qB − 1
2
(
R− 1
2
k
)
, qM − 1 + α
2α
(
R +
3
2
k
)}
,
she implements her bliss point in the first period, i.e. qA1 = q
A, and loses the
second-period election. Otherwise, she implements qA1 = q
M and is reelected
with probability 1
2
.
The proof is in the appendix.
To get the intuition of the last result, consider that a radical incumbent
would suffer a large disutility by committing to the median voter’s preferred
policy. Thus, she deliberately chooses to lose the elections, and maximizes
current utility by implementing her bliss point. Banks (1990) and Callander
and Wilkie (2007) have qualitatively similar results, in that extremist candi-
dates announce their ideal policy, because it is too costly for them to commit
to moderate policies.
Let us conclude this Section by commenting on some comparative statics
results. Looking at the expression for ω in Proposition (5), we can easily con-
clude that, when the rent R from office increases, the threshold ω decreases,
and the incumbent is less likely to implement her bliss point as it pays more
to be reelected. Instead, an increase in k has an ambiguous effect on ω.
On the one hand, it increases the incoherence cost, thereby decreasing the
incentive to win the elections. On the other hand, it increases the distance
of q∗B2 from q
A, so that the incumbent has a larger incentive to avoid losing
the elections.
5 Government debt as a strategic variable
In this section we extend the model by enabling the first-period incumbent
politician to use a strategic variable, denoted as b, which moves in the second
period the bliss points of all agents in a given direction. By means of b,
the incumbent can move the median bliss point away from the first-period
platform of the opponent, so as to undermine the effectiveness of the electoral
platform as a commitment device.
We frame the theory in a general way, because incumbents in different
contexts have different tools at their disposal, to affect voters’ indirect utility.
For instance, if voters consider the environment a salient issue, a ‘brown’
incumbent can influence voters through the release of biased information
that undermines the negative effects of carbon-driven technology on climate
12
change. As we show below, a ‘natural’ example for b can be government
debt, used to finance unproductive government expenditure that does not
yield any benefit to individuals. We frequently refer to debt in the model
and the analysis given its relevance in the public debate and in the political
economy literature.
Example 1 Assume that citizens (whose mass is equal to one)
are indexed by their income yi, and have linear utility over private
consumption c and a public good g:
u(c, g) = c+ g.
Let us assume that, in the past, the government has accumu-
lated debt b that must be repaid in this period. Individual and
government budget constraints are the following:
yi(1− τ) = c,
(τ − τ
2
2
)y = g + b,
where τ is a proportional tax rate, τ
2
2
is the deadweight cost
of taxation, y is aggregate income, and b is the stock of debt
accumulated in the past that has to be repaid in the current
period.
It is immediate to find that individual i’s most preferred level of
taxation is given by τ i := 1 − yi
y
. The most preferred level of
public good is then easily computed by subtracting debt repay-
ment from government revenues, i.e. (τ i − (τ i)2
2
)y − b. Clearly,
if the elected politician has increased b in the previous period,
individuals’ preferred level of public good shifts downwards. Let
us define gi as the preferred level of public good by i if there was
no debt: gi := (τ i − (τ i)2
2
)y, and gi(b) as the preferred level of
public good with a positive debt: gi(b) := gi − b.
Let us now write the following utility:
u∗i(g) = c− ci + g − gi = [c(g) + g − (ci + gi(b))]− b.
where c(g) = yi(1−τ(g)), and τ(g) is τ such that the government
budget constraint is satisfied with equality. Utility u∗ is equiv-
alent to u, as we subtracted a constant ci + gi. Note that the
function inside square brackets is concave, and it has a maximum
in 0 when the government implements the individual optimal level
of public good g = gi(b). Moreover u∗ is decreasing in b, because
b reduces the amount of taxation devoted to the public good.
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In this extension of the game, at the end of the first period, the incumbent
chooses b. Variable b does not affect utilities in the first period, but it influ-
ences the bliss points of all players in the second period. Consistently with
the loss function used in the previous section, we assume that, for each citizen
i ∈ S and for the two candidates A and B, the bliss point qi(b) in the second
period depends on b ∈ R as follows: qi(b) = qi− b. If b = 0, the bliss point qi
is the same in both periods. Hence, by increasing b the incumbent does not
affect the distance between the median voter’s preferred policy and the two
candidates’ bliss points. Note that b does not provide any advantage for the
incumbent directly, but only insofar as it affects the commitment created by
policy platforms.17
Citizen i ∈ S has the following second period utility:
ui(q) = −|q − qi(b)|.
As in example 1, increasing b moves the preferred policy of each player to-
wards a lower provision of q, and it does not increase the utility of voters.18
Moreover, differently from a model of fiscal illusion, in our framework voters
are rational and forward looking, thus even if debt increased the utility of
voters in the first period, this would not increase the probability of election
of the incumbent, because they evaluate politicians based on their second
period utility. Therefore we switch off one of the main channels explored
in the literature for the successful implementation of government debt by
incumbents.
We assume that, if a politician is indifferent between different levels of b,
she implements the lowest one.
The first-period incumbent A chooses b at the end of the first period,
17If, for example, the policy space is bounded below, we can construct a simple model
where a conservative incumbent can create enough debt to shift politicians and voters’
preferences towards a low (future) policy, so that the incumbent’s bliss point becomes
the lower bound of the policy space, and the median voter’s preferred policy becomes
mechanically closer to the incumbent’s preferred policy. In this case, the incumbent is
reelected. These dynamics imply that a large fraction of the electorate is in favor of the
lower bound of the policy space, a situation that is rarely observed in reality. A similar
approach is considered by Hodler (2011), where this issue is tackled by assuming that
there are only two levels of spending, high or low.
18In many real life applications, b could have a negative effect on voters’ welfare, as
shown in example (1) in the case of government debt. We do not analyze the welfare
consequences of b, because we focus on the strategic incentive that the incumbent has
in using b to be reelected. Moreover including a cost of b in the second period voters’
utility would not change the results, because when citizens vote debt has already been
implemented.
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maximizing the following:
−|q − qA(b)|+ PA [R−H] .
The timing of the new game is the following:
1. The incumbent A implements policy qA1 ;
2. The opponent B makes alternative proposal qB2 ;
3. The incumbent chooses b;
4. At the beginning of period 2, all bliss points move: qi(b) = qi − b;
5. Platforms are announced, elections and policy implementation take
place as before.
6 Equilibrium with strategic debt
As we have shown in the previous section, the incumbent politician A either
ties with B, if she is moderate: qA ≥ ω, or she loses the second period elec-
tion, if she is radical: qA < ω. Thus, in what follows, we study the incentive
that an incumbent politician might have to implement debt aiming at win-
ning elections in the second period. We already know what is the equilibrium
behavior of A, if b = 0. We therefore characterize her equilibrium behavior,
by assuming that she implements b to win the second period election, and
we compare her utility in the two cases, to determine the equilibrium of the
game. As usual, we solve the game by backward induction.
The solutions for the implemented policy q∗P2 (b), as a function of q
P
1 , q
P
2 ,
are the same as in Proposition 1 except that now the bliss point qP (b) is a
function of b:
q∗A2 =

qA12 + k, if q
A − b > qA12 + k,
qA − b, if ∣∣qA − b− qA12∣∣ ≤ k,
qA12 − k, if qA − b < qA12 − k.
Given that we consider the conditions under which A implements a positive
b and wins the election, B’s second period platform is qB2 = q
M(b), which is
her equilibrium platform in case she loses. Thus, the policy implemented by
B, in case she were elected, is as follows:
q∗B2 =

qB1 +α(q
M−b)
1+α
+ k, if qB − b > qB1 +α(qM−b)
1+α
+ k,
qB − b, if
∣∣∣qB − b− qB1 +α(qM−b)1+α ∣∣∣ ≤ k,
qB1 +α(q
M−b)
1+α
− k, if qB − b < qB1 +α(qM−b)
1+α
− k.
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The policy q∗B2 is a decreasing function of b. If |qB− b− q
A
1 +α(q
M−b)
1+α
| > k, q∗B2
moves to the left by α
1+α
for a unitary increase of b. This happens because
the opponent is anchored to the first period electoral platform qB1 . This
anchor creates a wedge between qM(b), which moves to the left by 1 for a
unitary increase in b, and q∗B2 . This wedge is what gives to the incumbent
the possibility to win the second period election.19
For a given level of b, in the second period the incumbent A chooses
platform qA2 as close as possible to q
A but such that the implemented policy
q∗A2 satisfies
−∣∣qM(b)− q∗A2 ∣∣ > −∣∣qM(b)− q∗B2 ∣∣,
where q∗P2 depends on b, q
P
1 , q
P
2 . Taking into account that q
∗A
2 < q
M(b) < q∗B2 ,
and solving for the level of qA2 such that the median is indifferent between
the candidates, we get:
qM − b = q
∗A
2 + q
∗B
2
2
. (1)
Clearly, if A chooses the level of platform qA2 + , where q
A
2 solves equation
(1), she wins the elections in the second period.20
Next, let us show what would be the optimal level of b implemented by
the incumbent politician in the first period. The incumbent politician solves
the following problem:21
max
b∈R
−[qA12 − k − qA + b]−
1
2
k, if qA12 − k > qA − b; (2)
max
b∈R
−[qA − b− qA + b], if qA12 = qA − b,
where qA2 is determined implicitly by equation (1). The incoherence cost is
equal to 1
2
k, if qA12 − k > qA − b, and it is equal to 0, if qA12 = qB − b, because
in the latter case A in the second period implements her average platform
qA − b.
By increasing b, the incumbent can exploit the wedge between qM(b) and
q∗B2 to propose a policy q
A
2 which is closer to her new bliss point. Therefore,
19Here Assumption 4 is crucial in order for an equilibrium to exist. Indeed if qB2 ranged
in R, B could always implement qB2 that would erase the effect of qB1 on implemented
policy q∗B2 and strategic debt would not help incumbent A. If instead q
B
2 has a lower
bound, the ‘anchor effect’ of qB1 is still present and A wins using b.
20We consider → 0 in the remaining analysis.
21We do not specify qA12 for the case q
A
12 + k < q
A − b, because under no circumstance
the incumbent implements qA1 such that her second period implemented policy q
A
12 + k is
farther from qM than qB(b).
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there is a trade-off between b and platform qA2 : a higher level of b reduces the
need to commit to a moderate policy through the electoral platform in period
2, in order to win the second-period election. The incumbent can increase
b up until she wins in the second period by proposing a policy qA2 that lets
her implement her new bliss point: qA12 = q
A − b. Substituting this average
platform in equation (1) we obtain an implicit solution for the equilibrium
level of debt b∗ as a function of qB1 :
2(qM − b∗) = qA − b∗ + q∗B2 .
Before the implementation of b, the opponent chooses alternative proposal
qB1 . Given that, for any q
B
1 incumbent A implements b that ensures her
election in period 2, B is indifferent among all alternative proposals. Thus,
by Assumption 2 she proposes the median voter’s bliss point: qB1 = q
M .
The incumbent in the first period implements qA1 in order to maximize the
following utility:
−|qA1 − qA| − |qA − b− qA + b|.
Therefore the incumbent implements her bliss point: qA1 = q
A.
We now consider the decision of the incumbent to either use strategic
debt, or to avoid its use and behave as analyzed in the previous section. Let
us consider the case of a radical incumbent: qA < ω. Her utility is strictly
larger by implementing b∗ and winning the second period election, than the
utility by implementing b = 0 and losing the second period election, because
in both situations she implements her bliss point in the first period, but in
the first case she enjoys also the second period rent R and she implements
her new bliss point q∗A2 = q
A − b.
A moderate incumbent, qA ≥ ω, can either implement qA1 = qM and tie in
the second period election, or implement her bliss point in the first term, use
debt b∗ and win the second period election. She chooses the latter option,
because it gives her a larger utility from policy in both periods and she enjoys
rent R with probability 1. Moreover, a moderate incumbent implements in
equilibrium a more extremist policy in both periods if she can use strategic
debt.
We can therefore state the following result:
Proposition 6 (Equilibrium debt) In equilibrium the incumbent imple-
ments b∗ > 0, which shifts the median voter away from the first-period plat-
form of the opponent, and gets reelected. Specifically:
b∗ =
{
(1 + α)
(
qM − qA − k) , if qA > 2qM − qB,
(1 + α)
(
qM − qA + k) , if qA ≤ 2qM − qB.
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The proof is in the appendix.
The next proposition summarizes the comparative statics:
Proposition 7 (Comparative statics) The following holds:
i. The more radical is the incumbent, the larger is b;
ii. The larger is the memory bias α given to qP2 in the incoherence cost, the
larger is b;
iii. The level of b decreases (increases) with k, if the incumbent is more
moderate (radical) than her opponent.
The intuition for the last three results is as follows. A more radical
incumbent sets a larger b, as she implements her bliss point in the first period
and she needs to move the median voter’s bliss point farther away from the
opponent’s first period moderate proposal and closer to her own first period
policy.
Moreover, the larger is the memory bias associated to the second-period
electoral platform α, the larger is b, since the opponent is less anchored to her
first-period (losing) moderate proposal. If α goes to infinity, only the second
period platform matters for the second-period implemented policy. In this
case b goes to infinity, as there is no finite level of b that allows the incumbent
to win. This case nests the Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition,
which is characterized by α → ∞ and k = 0. Thus standard models of
electoral competition with full commitment cannot deliver the main result of
this paper.
Finally, consider figure 1 below. If the incumbent is more moderate than
her opponent, a low b is needed for the former to be reelected. Thus all bliss
points move to the left by a small amount b. The new bliss point of the
opponent will still be farther from the median’s than qB12 +k, which would be
the implemented policy by B. Clearly, an increase in k increases the distance
between the median voter’s bliss point and the opponent’s implemented pol-
icy, because qB12 + k increases, making B less attractive to the median voter.
Therefore the incumbent can implement a lower b to win the election. If
instead the incumbent is more radical than her opponent (see figure 2), she
has to implement a large b to win the election. Thus all bliss points move
to the left by a large amount b. At the same time, because of the ‘anchor’
effect of qB1 on q
B
12, q
B
12 moves to the left only by
α
1+α
b < b. For a sufficiently
large b, the new bliss point of the opponent moves closer to the median than
qB12 − k, which would be the implemented policy by B. If k increases, B’s
implemented policy gets closer to the median voter’s bliss point, because
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qB12 − k decreases, making B more attractive to the median voter. Thus the
incumbent must choose a larger b to win the election.
Figure 1: Equilibrium with debt, where A is more moderate than B. A wins
by implementing qA − b in the second term. If elected, B would implement
qB12 + k. Policy q
A − b is an  closer to qM − b than qB12 + k.
Figure 2: Equilibrium with debt, where A is less moderate than B. A wins
by implementing qA − b in the second term. If elected, B would implement
qB12 − k. Policy qA − b is an  closer to qM − b than qB12 − k.
The comparative statics point to a subtle aspect of the effect of b on the
opponent’s behavior. If the opponent is radical and the incumbent imple-
ments b, the former loses as she would need to commit to the new median’s
bliss point, but her average platform is anchored to the ‘old’ median. In
this case, the average platform is still a commitment device, because B com-
mits to a policy which is more moderate than her bliss point, but weaker
(qB12 > q
M(b)) than in case of no debt (qB12 = q
M). Debt has a ‘low commit-
ment’ effect on the opponent.
If the opponent is moderate and the incumbent implements b, the op-
ponent loses as her average platform, which is anchored to the old median,
is farther from the new median’s preferred policy than her bliss point. The
average platform creates a commitment to a policy which is less attractive
to the median than her bliss point qB. In this case, debt has a ‘commitment
to a losing policy’ effect on the opponent.
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7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the incentives of an incumbent politician to strategi-
cally use debt to reduce the opponent’s commitment to moderate policies in
a context where politicians pay an incoherence cost, due to deviations of the
implemented policy from past platforms. The incoherence cost makes it pos-
sible for the politicians to exploit platforms to commit to moderate policies
and please the median voter. If an increase in the level of debt moves voters’
most preferred policy towards a lower public good provision, the opponent
politician, who has always been in favor of a high public good provision,
will not be able to commit to the new median voter’s bliss point, as she is
anchored to her old policy platform. Given that the opponent’s commitment
is reduced, voters anticipate that she would deviate from a more moderate
platform. Thus, debt secures reelection to a conservative incumbent who
prefers low provision of the public good.
Our analysis contributes to the debate on optimal fiscal rules (see Halac
and Yared (2014)). While in principle flexibility in the use of government
debt could increase citizens’ welfare if debt acts as a countercyclical policy,
it is well known that governments have perverse incentives in the creation
of deficits which lead to excessive debt. This paper adds to the political
economy of government debt by suggesting another reason why it could be
desirable to limit governments’ discretion in the creation of deficits.
Although we applied our model to the use of government debt, we believe
that our theoretical framework can encompass other tools that an incum-
bent politician can exploit to decrease the commitment ability of her oppo-
nent. For instance, the incumbent can influence citizens’ preferences through
a strategic manipulation of information about the consequences of specific
policy interventions. At the same time, citizens may decide not to trust
politicians. Exploring a game of asymmetric information in this context is
an interesting direction for future work.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition (1)
The first order condition of the maximization problem is
1− 1
k
(q − qP12) = 0, if q < qP , (3)
−1− 1
k
(q − qP12) = 0, if q ≥ qP . (4)
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The solution is
q = qP12 + k, if q
P
12 + k < q
P ,
q = qP12 − k, if qP12 − k ≥ qP .
When the following conditions are both satisfied: qP12 + k ≥ qP , qP12− k < qP ,
the lhs of first order condition (3) is positive for q < qP . Indeed 1− 1
k
(q−qP12) >
0 implies q < qP12 + k, which is satisfied, because q < q
P < qP12 + k. Similarly
the lhs of first order condition (4) is negative for q ≥ qP . Hence the maximum
is in q = qP .

Proof of Proposition (2)
Let us first prove that it is in the interest of both candidates to propose
policies in order to win the election. If candidate P loses the second period
election, she receives utility −|qP−q∗−P2 |. If she wins the election she receives
−|qP − q∗P2 | + R − H. We argued that the largest value of H is 12k. By
assumption 1 R is larger than 1
2
k, therefore −|qP − q∗P2 |+ R−H > −|qP −
q∗−P2 |. Similarly, if candidates can choose between losing or tying, they rather
tie: 1
2
[−|qP − q∗P2 |+R−H]− 12 |qP − q∗−P2 | > −|qP − q∗−P2 |.
Secondly, let us identify the candidate who wins the second period elec-
tion. The distance between qM and the equilibrium policy q∗P2 , stated in
Proposition (1), weakly decreases as qP2 becomes closer to q
M . Therefore by
proposing qP2 = q
M , candidate P maximizes −|qM − q∗P2 |. Let us consider
the case in which the median voter strictly prefers candidate P , when both
candidates propose qM . Let us prove that there is no equilibrium where the
two candidates proposes policies qA2 , q
B
2 which entail that candidate P is not
elected. Candidate P can deviate by proposing qM and be elected. Indeed,
by proposing qM , P increases the utility of the median voter −|qM − q∗P2 |,
which becomes larger than the utility −|qM − q∗−P2 |. Moreover, as shown
in the beginning of this proof, P increases her utility by deviating and win-
ning. Therefore in any voting equilibrium it must be that candidate P is
elected. If instead the median voter is indifferent between the two candi-
dates, if they propose qM , then each candidate is elected with probability 1
2
and no candidate has an incentive to deviate.

Proof of Proposition (3)
The first case has already been shown in the proof of Proposition (2). Let
us consider the second case. The loser is indifferent between any proposal,
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because she is not elected, thus she does not influence the implemented policy.
Therefore by assumption she implements qM . The winner chooses qP2 to
minimize the distance |qP − qP12| conditional on winning, because she receives
a larger utility from policy and she reduces the incoherence cost. Note that
this implies that, if politician P can win implementing her bliss point qP ,
she proposes electoral platform qP2 such that q
P
12 = q
P . Thus politician P
does not propose electoral platform |qP12− qP | < k and qP12 6= qP , because she
implements q∗P2 = q
P , but she pays a positive incoherence cost.

Proof of Proposition (4)
If qA1 = q
M , and qB1 = q
M , both candidates propose electoral platforms
qA2 = q
B
2 = q
M in the second period and they tie. B has no incentive to
deviate, by implementing qB1 > q
M , because by Proposition (2) she would
lose the election: qM − k > 2qM − qB1 +αqM
1+α
− k. Let us consider the case
qA1 < q
M . In this situation B wins the election, because there exist qB1 and
qB2 such that the median voter is better off by voting for B, for example
qB1 = q
B
2 = q
M . Given that A is a sure loser, she implements qA2 = q
M .
If qA <
qA1 +αq
M
1+α
− k, A implements qA1 +αqM
1+α
− k, if elected. In order to
win B has to implement a policy larger than 2qM − qA1 +αqM
1+α
+ k. If qB <
2qM − qA1 +αqM
1+α
+ k, she makes an alternative proposal in the first period, so
that her average platform is equal to her bliss point: qB12 = q
B, which ensures
her victory. If instead qB ≥ 2qM − qA1 +αqM
1+α
+ k, she makes an alternative
proposal in the first period, so that she wins in the second period: qB12 + k =
2qM − qA1 +αqM
1+α
+ k − . Such average platform exists because qA1 < qM .
If qA ≥ qA1 +αqM
1+α
− k, A implements qA, if elected. In order to win B has
to implement a policy larger than 2qM − qA. If qB < 2qM − qA, she makes
an alternative proposal in the first period, so that her average platform is
equal to her bliss point: qB12 = q
B, which ensures her victory. If instead
qB ≥ 2qM − qA, she makes an alternative proposal in the first period, so that
she wins in the second period: qB12 + k = 2q
M − qA − . In the statement of
Proposition (4) we consider → 0.

Proof of Proposition (5)
If A loses, her utility is as follows:
−0− (q∗B2 − qA)+R,
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where q∗B2 is determined by Proposition (4) where q
A
1 is substituted with q
A.
As shown in Proposition (4), B in equilibrium either wins or ties against A.
If A does not lose, the best she can do is to implement qA1 in order to tie
against B: qA1 = q
M . If A ties against B her utility is as follows:
−(qM − qA)− 1
2
(
qM − k − qA +R− 1
2
k
)
− 1
2
(
qM + k − qA)+R.
Let us define the four following expressions:
x :=qM − 1 + α
α
k,
y :=(2 + α)qM − (1 + α)(qB − k),
z :=2qM − qB − 1
2
(
R− 1
2
k
)
,
u :=qM − 1 + α
2α
(
R +
3
2
k
)
.
Let us consider what is the utility of A, in case she chooses to lose the
election. If A loses, she implements her bliss point: qA1 = q
A. Therefore,
by Proposition (4), if qA < q
A+αqM
1+α
− k and qB < 2qM − qA+αqM
1+α
+ k, B
implements qB. A chooses to lose, if
−2qM + 2qA − 1
4
k +
1
2
R < −qB + qA.
The previous three inequalities can be simplified as follows:
qA < x,
qA < y,
qA < z.
(5)
If qA < q
A+αqM
1+α
− k and qB ≥ 2qM − qA+αqM
1+α
+ k, B implements 2qM −
qA+αqM
1+α
+ k − . A chooses to lose, if
−2qM + 2qA − 1
4
k +
1
2
R < −2qM + q
A + αqM
1 + α
− k + + qA.
The previous three inequalities can be simplified as follows:
qA < qM − 1+α
α
k,
qA ≥ (2 + α)qM − (1 + α)(qB − k),
qA < qM − 1+α
2α
(
R + 3
2
k − 2) .
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The first inequality is implied by the third inequality (u < x) because → 0
and R − 1
2
k > 0. Indeed the following holds: qM − 1+α
2α
(
R + 3
2
k − 2) <
qM − 1+α
2α
(
R + 3
2
k − 2) + 1+α
2α
(
R− 1
2
k
)
= qM − 1+α
α
(k − 2). Thus the
system reduces to the following:{
qA ≥ y,
qA < u.
(6)
If qA ≥ qA+αqM
1+α
− k and qB < 2qM − qA, B implements qB. In this situation
A chooses to lose if the following holds:
qA ≥ qM − 1+α
α
k,
qA < 2qM − qB,
qA < 2qM − qB − 1
2
(
R− 1
2
k
)
.
The second inequality is implied by the third inequality, thus the system
reduces to the following: {
qA ≥ x,
qA < z.
(7)
If qA ≥ qA+αqM
1+α
− k and qB ≥ 2qM − qA, B implements 2qM − qA− . In this
situation A chooses to lose if:
−2qM + 2qA − 1
4
k +
1
2
R < −2A + qA + + qA,
which implies:
1
2
(
R− 1
2
k
)
< .
The last inequality is not satisfied, if  → 0. Thus if qA ≥ qM − 1+α
α
k and
qA ≥ 2qM − qB, A ties in the election.
To finish the proof, we make use of the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 The following holds:
1. y ≤ u⇔ z ≤ u⇔ y ≤ z;
2. y ≤ x ≤ z is not satisfied.
Let us prove the first point: y ≤ u ⇔ (2 + α)qM − (1 + α)(qB − k) ≤
qM − 1+α
2α
(
R + 3
2
k
) ⇔ α(qM − qB) + (3
4
+ α)k + 1
2
R ≤ 0, z ≤ u ⇔ 2qM −
qB − 1
2
(
R− 1
2
k
) ≤ qM − 1+α
2α
(
R + 3
2
k
) ⇔ α(qM − qB) + (3
4
+ α)k + 1
2
R ≤
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0, y ≤ z ⇔ (2 + α)qM − (1 + α)(qB − k) ≤ 2qM − qB − 1
2
(
R− 1
2
k
) ⇔
α(qM − qB) + (3
4
+ α)k + 1
2
R ≤ 0.
We prove that y ≤ x ≤ z is not satisfied: y ≤ x ⇔ (2 + α)qM −
(1 + α)(qB − k) ≤ qM − 1+α
α
k ⇔ qB > qM + 1+α
α
k, x ≤ z ⇔ qM − 1+α
α
k ≤
2qM−qB−(R− 1
2
k
)⇔ qB ≤ qM+ 1+α
α
k− 1
2
(R− 1
2
k). Given that qM+ 1+α
α
k >
qM + 1+α
α
k− 1
2
(R− 1
2
k), the two inequalities cannot be satisfied at the same
time.
Finally, if z ≤ x and y ≤ z, it implies that z ≤ u and y ≤ u. System
(5) reduces to qA < y, system (6) reduces to y ≤ qA < u, and system (7) is
not satisfied. Therefore A choses to lose the election if qA < u. If z ≤ x and
y > z, it implies that z > u and y > u. System (5) reduces to qA < z, system
(6) and system (7) are not satisfied. Therefore A choses to lose the election
if qA < z. If z > x, it implies y > x. If also y ≤ z, it implies that z ≤ u and
y ≤ u. System (5) reduces to qA < x, system (6) reduces to y ≤ qA < u, and
system (7) reduces to x ≤ qA < z. Therefore A choses to lose the election if
qA < u. If z > x, it implies y > x. If also y > z, it implies that z > u and
y > u. System (5) reduces to qA < x, system (6) is not satisfied, and system
(7) reduces to x ≤ qA < z. Therefore A choses to lose the election if qA < z.
Moreover in all cases the following holds: qA < max{z, u}.

Proof of Proposition (6)
We first prove that problem (2) leads to solution b∗, and secondly we provide
an explicit formula for b∗. We find the maximizers in the two cases: qA12 =
qA − b and qA12 − k ≥ qA − b, and then we compare the two utilities to find
the maximizer that solves problem (2). If qA12 = q
A− b, A simply implements
b∗ that solves equation 2(qM − b∗) = qA− b∗+ q∗B2 . Platform qA2 , for the case
q∗A12 − k ≥ qA − b∗, is determined implicitly by equation (1) as
qA12 =

2(qM − b)− qM+α(qM−b)
1+α
− k + k, if qB − b > qB1 +α(qM−b)
1+α
+ k,
2(qM − b)− qB + b+ k, if
∣∣∣qB − b− qB1 +α(qM−b)1+α ∣∣∣ ≤ k,
2(qM − b)− qM+α(qM−b)
1+α
+ k + k, if qB − b < qB1 +α(qM−b)
1+α
− k.
The derivative of the objective function is:
2− α
1 + α
− 1, if
∣∣∣∣qB − b− qM + α(qM − b)1 + α
∣∣∣∣ > k, (8)
2− 1− 1, if
∣∣∣∣qB − b− qM + α(qM − b)1 + α
∣∣∣∣ ≤ k. (9)
The derivative (8) is positive. The derivative (9) is zero. Inequality |qB −
b− qM+α(qM−b)
1+α
| ≤ k is equivalent to (1 +α)(qB− qM −k) ≤ b ≤ (1 +α)(qB−
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qM + k). Thus, if b < (1 + α)(qB − qM − k) the derivative is positive; if
(1 + α)(qB − qM − k) ≤ b ≤ (1 + α)(qB − qM + k) the derivative is zero; if
b > (1 + α)(qB − qM + k) the derivative is positive. Thus the maximum of
the function is the largest value of b such that qA12 − k > qA − b, where qA2
satisfies equation (1). Therefore it is b¯−  such that b¯ solves qA12−k = qA− b¯.
Note that, by substituting qA12 − k = qA − b¯ in equation (1), we obtain
2(qM − b¯) = qA − b¯+ q∗B2 . Thus b¯−  = b∗ − . Let us prove that b∗ −  (and
implementing qA2 such that q12 − k > qA − (b∗ − )) provides a lower utility
than b∗ (and implementing qA2 such that q
A
12 = q
A − b∗). The utility in the
former case is equal to −− 1
2
k, because the incumbent’s average platform is
such that qA12−k > qA−(b∗−) and the incumbent has to pay to incoherence
cost 1
2
k. In the latter case it is equal to 0. Given that 1
2
k > 0, the utility is
larger when A implements b∗, which is the solution to problem (2).
Secondly, we provide an explicit formula for b∗:{
2(qM − b∗) = qA − b∗ + qM+α(qM−b∗)
1+α
+ k, if b∗ < (1 + α)(qB − qM − k),
2(qM − b∗) = qA − b∗ + qM+α(qM−b∗)
1+α
− k, if b∗ > (1 + α)(qB − qM + k), ⇔
b∗ =
{
(1 + α)
(
qM − qA − k) , if qM − qA − k < qB − qM − k,
(1 + α)
(
qM − qA + k) , if qM − qA + k > qB − qM + k, ⇔
b∗ =
{
(1 + α)
(
qM − qA − k) , if qA > 2qM − qB,
(1 + α)
(
qM − qA + k) , if qA < 2qM − qB.
This analysis is performed, by sending  to zero, which gave us the possibility
to assume that if A implements b∗, she wins even though the median is
indifferent between the two candidates. In the knife-edge case qA = 2qM−qB,
we instead need to consider condition (1) as an inequality:{
2(qM − b∗) > qA − b∗ + qM+α(qM−b∗)
1+α
+ k, if b∗ < (1 + α)(qB − qM − k),
2(qM − b∗) > qA − b∗ + qM+α(qM−b∗)
1+α
− k, if b∗ > (1 + α)(qB − qM + k), ⇔{
b∗ > (1 + α)
(
qM − qA − k) , if b∗ < (1 + α)(qB − qM − k),
b∗ > (1 + α)
(
qM − qA + k) , if b∗ > (1 + α)(qB − qM + k). (10)
Thus the incumbent implements b∗ + , such that b∗ satisfies the previous
conditions with equality. If qA = 2qM − qB, it implies qM − qA = qB − qM .
Therefore, among the conditions stated in system (10), only the following is
satisfied:
b∗ > (1 + α)
(
qM − qA + k) , if b∗ > (1 + α)(qB − qM + k),
Thus, if qA = 2qM − qB, politician implements b∗ +  such that b∗ satisfies
b∗ = (1 + α)
(
qM − qA + k). By sending  to zero we obtain the results
26
stated in Proposition (6). Finally note that b∗ in equilibrium is non negative:
if qA < 2qM − qB, qM − qA + k is larger than or equal to zero because
qM − qA ≥ 0. If qA > 2qM − qB, qM − qA− k is larger than zero, because, by
Assumption 3,
∣∣qA − qM ∣∣ > k.

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